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1. INTRODUCTION
With the collapse of socialism, all former centrally-planned economies began 
their path towards building a market economy and their final results depended on 
their starting positions, as well as their internal and external factors. 
The first process, the liberalisation of price and trade, led to inflation in almost 
all transition countries. Early in the transition, inflation averaged 450% a year in 
the Central Eastern European countries (CEE), nearly 900% in the Baltic States, 
and over 1000% in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Unfortu-
nately, the data for the mentioned period are not available for the South-Eastern 
European region. By 1998, however, annual inflation had been lowered to a sin-
gle digit in the first two groups and to around 30% in the third. Along with the 
high inflation rate, the transition countries needed to cope with another shock, 
the decline of production, and this reduction varied among transition countries. 
Therefore, the decline in output as well as economic growth in the CEE countries 
during the 1990s was the reflection of the national, policy strengths and weak-
nesses as well as external influences.
One key area has been the development of the financial services sector. Thus 
far, a great deal of attention has been given to the transformation of the banking 
industry and, to a somewhat lesser degree, to the development of local capital 
markets. In contrast, scant attention has been paid to insurance, the third corner-
stone of the financial services sector. 
Following the adoption of the Stalinist economic model, the state became the 
sole provider and thus exerted a monopoly over the market. In some instances, 
the state operated a two-tier insurance system, one through a state-owned enter-
prise (SOE) that was responsible for handling all domestic insurance and another 
SOE that dealt with all forms of insurance that required an element of foreign 
(hard) currency due to the international nature of the coverage. In the Soviet Un-
ion, Gosstrakh (State Insurance) was founded in 1921 to handle all domestic and 
international insurance business on behalf of the state. In 1947, responsibility for 
international business was transferred to a newly created SOE called Ingosstrakh 
(International State Insurance). In 1958, the state further refined the role of Gos-
strakh by dividing the firm into separate operating units for each of the 15 re-
publics, although Gosstrakh retained central control of these via the Ministry of 
Finance.
A number of CEE countries had also established similar two-tier systems, al-
though some at a much later date than in the Soviet Union. In Hungary, the state 
insurer was Állami Biztosító (ÁB), which had acted as the sole provider of both 
domestic and international insurance after taking over these duties from the Min-
istry of Finance in 1954. In 1986, as part of further reform measures, the state 
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enacted legislation that partially liberalised the country’s insurance industry by 
removing ÁB’s monopoly with the formation of a second state-owned insurer, 
Hungária Biztosító (Hungarian Insurance Co.). Government legislation speci-
fied that ÁB retain the bulk of the life insurance policies, while Hungária took 
over the portfolios of foreign trade insurance, motor liability, and reinsurance 
accounts. Hence, these two state providers exercised a duopoly control over the 
Hungarian insurance market.1
In Yugoslavia, the state insurer was DOZ (State Insurance Establishment), es-
tablished during the 1940s to transact all domestic and international insurance 
business. In the early 1960s, DOZ’s monopoly position was abolished and replaced 
by 128 communal insurance establishments spread throughout the country. Poor 
performance and national interests led to the restructuring of the system during 
1968 into 11 insurance and reinsurance firms based in each of the respective re-
publics. This created two amalgamated insurers/re-insurers, two sole re-insurers, 
and seven sole insurers. Under this system, appropriate premium payments were 
simply deducted directly from the wages of the employees participating in the 
scheme. However, it should be noted that such policies were often very simplistic 
in nature and of limited value and utility.2
Generally, non-life policies focused on motor, household as well as numerous 
compulsory types of insurance. Non-life policies were paid for in the same man-
ner as life policies and they too were quite basic and of a limited and restricted 
scope, especially given the reality of a continuous shortage economy experienced 
during the 1970–80s. In the case of motor insurance, which was a compul sory 
line, it tended to concentrate on the aspect of liability for many of the same rea-
sons cited above. Most other types of non-life coverage were seen as non-es-
sential under the communist system since the state guaranteed the basic needs 
of the citizenry in terms of healthcare, education, employment, and pensions. In 
addition, compulsory insurance such as third party motor and agriculture related 
policies had a very unique character. 
Overall, the domestic insurance system was controlled by the state provider, 
which established premiums at almost arbitrary levels for each of the few prod-
ucts it offered and for which the state was the sole underwriter. Therefore, the 
premiums charged bore very little correlation, if any, to the actual risks involved, 
given the nature of the coverage. Premium payments were used to offset both 
losses incurred via claims during the year and the operating expenses of the pro-
1  For further details of the evolution of the Hungarian insurance market, see Pye (1999: 59–
92).
2  For further details on the evolution of the Yugoslav insurance market, see Rajičić (1997: 
75–90 ).
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vider. Subsequently, surpluses from operations were absorbed by the state and 
deficits were guaranteed by it. Regarding non-life products, there was little or no 
attempt to estimate or provide for future liabilities that had not materialised dur-
ing the course of the year.
The non-life insurance markets of almost all transition countries in Eastern 
Europe started to grow rapidly in the 1990s due to improved economic conditions 
and the introduced reforms, which had to be implemented prior to the EU acces-
sion. By introducing risk pooling and reducing the impact of large losses on firms 
and households, the sector reduced the amount of capital that would be needed to 
cover these losses individually, encouraging additional output, investment, inno-
vation, and competition. By introducing risk-based pricing for insurance protec-
tion, the sector can change the behaviour of economic agents, contributing to the 
prevention of accidents, improved health outcomes, and efficiency gains. Finally, 
the sector can also improve the efficiency of other segments of the financial sec-
tor such as banking and bond markets (e.g., by enhancing the value of collateral 
through property insurance, and reducing losses at default through credit guaran-
tees and enhancements). Nevertheless, this growth did not occur in the Eastern 
European countries at the same level (Chart 1).
This paper’s contribution lies in a new effort to understand what drives non-
life insurance consumption in 14 Central and South-Eastern European countries. 
As a measurer of non-life insurance demand, we use non-life insurance penetra-
tion. We apply the Johansen cointegration and vector error correction approach to 
estimate the relationship between the variables. 
Chart 1. Non-life insurance penetration in selected Central and South- Eastern European 
countries, 1995–2010
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The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature 
on theoretical research and empirical findings. Section 3 presents the methodol-
ogy and data, which we incorporate into the analysis. The results of the empirical 
research are given in Section 4. The paper finishes with some concluding remarks 
and suggestions for future work that are outlined in Section 5.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
According to economic theory, risk insurance products enhance welfare by trans-
ferring uncertainty from risk-averse individuals to risk-neutral ones, the in surers, 
who pool many risks together and manage them efficiently (Mossin 1968). The-
oretical models of non-life insurance demand, following the seminal papers of 
Pratt (1964), Arrow (1971), and Mossin (1968), predict that for a given level 
of risk exposure and a given price, insurance demand increases with risk aver-
sion, probability of loss, and total wealth (Szpiro 1985; Sweeney – Beard 1992). 
Whether the propensity to insure – i.e., the desired coverage as a percentage of the 
wealth at stake – should increase or not depends on the behaviour of risk aversion: 
Arrow (1971) shows that it increases if people are characterised by increasing 
relative risk aversion. Most of the above authors have commented on the elastic-
ity of insurance consumption with respect to income and wealth, in the light of 
the long-standing debate on insurance as an inferior good. Mossin (1968) first 
gave conditions for this to happen: the intuition is that if the utility function is 
characterised by decreasing absolute risk aversion, a higher endowment of wealth 
reduces risk aversion and therefore the demand for insurance. Moreover, while 
Mossin’s Theorem claims that full coverage is optimal under the fair actuarial 
price,3 the degree of coverage decreases with the loadings4 (Schlesinger 2000).
The so-called “inverted economic cycle” of insurance, in which one pays first, 
then, in the event of loss, receives his dues, suggests that the financial rate of 
return, seen as an opportunity cost for those who allocate funds in an insurance 
3  Actuarially fair insurance has an expected net pay-off of zero. From a consumer’s point of 
view, an insurance contract is actuarially fair if the premiums paid are equal to the expected 
value of the compensation received. This expected value is, in turn, defined as the probability 
of the insured-against event occurring multiplied by the compensation received in the event of 
a loss. The reason that economists define actuarial fairness from the consumer’s point of view 
is that it yields useful predictions about consumer behaviour.
4  Loading is the amount added to the pure insurance cost to cover the operations cost of an 
insurer, the possibility that losses will be greater than statistically expected, and fluctuating 
interest rates on the insurer’s investments. The “pure” insurance cost is that portion of the 
premium estimated to be necessary for losses.
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policy, should be inversely related to demand. That is, self-insuring gives an 
opportunity-gain to invest the saved amount of the premium on financial mar-
kets, which increases along with the prevailing rate of return. However, Falciglia 
(1980) shows that higher market interest rates should lower insurance demand 
only if consumers have a decreasing risk aversion and are net savers; although 
these conditions seem reasonable, the relationship between interest rates and in-
surance demand nevertheless remains an empirical question.
The bulk of the existing empirical research focuses on the growth of the life 
sector, as the most frequently cited papers indicate (Browne – Kim 1993; Out-
reville 1996; Beck – Webb 2003; Li et al. 2007). The dependent variables for 
the vast majority of models were the life insurance density (money spent an-
nually on life insurance per capita) and the life insurance penetration (total life 
premium volume divided by GDP). Explanatory variables that have been shown 
to significantly impact life insurance demand are GDP per capita, inflation (real, 
anticipated, or feared), development of the banking sector, and institutional indi-
cators (such as investors protection, contract enforcement, and political stability). 
Variables that appear to have a borderline impact include education, old and/or 
young dependency ratio (ratio of the population above the age of 65, or below 15, 
to the number of persons aged 15 to 64), urbanisation, size of the social security 
system, life expectancy, and market structure. 
Sherden (1984) was first to focus on the sensitivity of non-life insurance pur-
chase. In a cross-sectional analysis of consumption patterns limited to automobile 
insurance in 359 towns and cities of the state of Massachusetts in 1979, he finds 
that the demand for motor insurance is generally inelastic with respect to price 
and income, and that the demand for comprehensive and collision coverage in-
creases substantially with increased population density.
Using an international dataset (12 countries over a period of 12 years), Been-
stock et al. (1988) examine the relationship between property liability insurance 
premiums and income, finding that marginal propensity to insure, i.e., an increase 
in insurance spending when income rises by 1$, differs from country to country, 
and premiums vary directly with real rates of interest. Thus, again, the decision 
of the consumer and his/her initial wealth status too are significant factors when 
short-run or long-run consumption of insurance is considered.
Based on a cross-sectional logarithmic model of non-life insurance penetration 
of 55 developing countries, Outreville (1990) confirms the main result of income 
elasticity being greater than unity. The level of financial development is the only 
other factor found to significantly impact non-life insurance consumption.
Browne et al. (2000) study 22 OECD countries from 1987 through 1993 and 
focus on the premium density of two lines of insurance: motor vehicle (usually 
purchased by households) and general liability (normally bought by businesses). 
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Panel data analysis demonstrates that income (GDP per capita), wealth, foreign 
firms’ market share, and the form of legal system (civil law or common law) are 
significant factors in explaining the purchase of the two types of insurance. Per 
capita income has a much greater impact on motor insurance than on general 
liability . 
Park et al. (2002) examine the impact of culture on insurance pervasiveness, 
defined as the combined penetration of life and non-life insurance. Four of Hof-
stede’s cultural dimensions are included in the panel regression analysis in addi-
tion to GNP, socio-political stability, and economic freedom. Esho et al. (2004) 
expand the work of Browne et al. (2000) by using a larger set of countries and 
by introducing the origin of the legal system and a measure of property rights 
in their model. Dummy variables, characterising the English, French, German, 
and Scandinavian legal system origin, are found to have an insignificant effect. 
Results show a robust relationship between the protection of property rights and 
insurance consumption as well as a significant effect of loss probability and in-
come. Esho et al. (2004) also include one of Hofstede’s dimensions, Uncertainty 
Avoidance, as a proxy for risk aversion. They find a marginally positive relation-
ship and conclude that culture does not seem to play an important role in non-life 
insurance demand. Nakata – Sawada (2007) test a semi-parametric model includ-
ing per capita income, population, the Gini coefficient, financial development, 
and contract enforceability. The coefficients usually have the expected signs, but 
only the contract enforceability variable is significant.  
The research of Njegomir – Stoic (2012) examines factors that affect the at-
tractiveness of 15 Eastern European non-life insurance markets for foreign insur-
ers for the period 2004–2009. The results indicate that the main forces affecting 
market attractiveness are insurance demand, entry barriers, market concentration 
and the return on investment, and that only market concentration has negative 
impact.
3. OUR DATA AND METHODOLOGY
We focus on factors that determine consumption of non-life insurance in our 
sample of 14 countries of Central and South-Eastern Europe (Albania, Bulgar-
ia, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, 
Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and Ukraine)5 over the period of 
1995–2010. In order to get more observations, we used annual panel data. We 
5 Serbia is not covered in the present study. For a separate analysis of that country ̕s insurance 
market, see Knežević et al. (2015).
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also carry out the analysis for three more homogeneous sub-groupings: the Bal-
kan countries (BAL-4), the Baltic countries (B-3), and CEE-7. 
Following a similar approach, nearly every single international comparative 
study uses insurance density and penetration as dependent variables. These vari-
ables have the advantage of being easily available, annually, for a large number 
of countries. A disadvantage of density and penetration is that they add up pre-
miums across various lines of insurance. In some countries, motor insurance is 
the dominant non-life policy, while other nations emphasise more liability insur-
ance. Aggregate premiums result in a loss of information, reducing the likelihood 
that significant explanatory variables will be discovered. Density and penetration 
measure slightly different effects. Penetration measures non-life insurance con-
sumption relative to the size of the economy, while density compares non-life 
insurance purchases across countries without adjusting for income. High GDP 
countries will spend more on insurance in absolute terms, as they have more as-
sets to protect. We therefore expect a very high correlation between insurance 
density and GDP – indeed, one of the reasons for the paucity of research in de-
terminants of non-life insurance may have been a belief that purchases are driven 
by wealth and little else. Penetration measures relative insurance consumption, as 
the overall wealth effect has been removed through division by GDP per capita. 
It measures how wealth is allocated to insurance in relative terms: two countries 
with similar GDP per capita may exhibit different insurance consumption pat-
terns, an effect captured by penetration and not by density. For this reason, we use 
penetration as our primary variable, and we do not use density in our research.
The factors that we use as control variables, which may explain the consump-
tion of non-life insurance, include the following: 
–  Economic: GDP per capita and number of passenger cars per 1000 people, 
number of dwellings per 1000 inhabitants, ratio of quasi-money, inflation, 
and trade;
–  Demographic: population density and level of education;
–  Institutional: rule of law;
–  Dummy variable for EU membership. 
Insurance penetration data are obtained from Sigma, Swiss Re Economic Re-
search & Consulting, Swiss Re, Zurich, and national insurance associations. Edu-
cation figures are obtained from EdStats, World Bank. GDP per capita, inflation, 
number of passenger cars per 1000 people, ratio of quasi-money, trade, and popu-
lation density are obtained from the World Development Indicators (WDI) data-
base. The number of dwellings per 1000 inhabitants is taken from the websites 
of national statistical offices. The rule of law index is obtained from Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (WGI). 
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3.1. Economic factors 
All previous studies, whether devoted to life or non-life insurance, conclude that 
income, measured as GDP per capita, is the most important factor affecting pur-
chasing decisions (Fortune 1973; Campbell 1980; Beenstock et al. 1986; Lewis 
1989; Outeville 1990). Beck – Webb (2003), Ward – Zurbruegg (2000), and 
Beenstock et al. (1988) point out a positive relationship in industrialised coun-
tries between national income and non-life insurance spending. Browne et al. 
(2000) analyse general liability and motor vehicle insurance in OECD countries, 
and find a significant positive relationship between premium density and GNP 
per capita. Additionally, Esho et al. (2004) examine developed and developing 
countries between 1984 and 1998, and find a strong positive relationship between 
national income and non-life insurance premium. Outreville (1990) and Ward – 
Zurbruegg (2000) strongly emphasise that the insurance industry, through risk 
transfer, financial intermediation, and employment can generate externalities and 
economic growth. The larger the level of income, the greater the demand for non-
life insurance to safeguard acquired property. We expect income to have a strong, 
positive impact on non-life insurance consumption.
Arrow (1971) suggests that the insurance demand increases with wealth when 
individuals are characterised by increasing relative risk aversion. In contrast, 
Mossin (1968) postulates conditions under which the optimal level of insurance 
coverage decreases with increases in wealth. The conflicting theoretical sugges-
tions of Arrow (1971) and Mossin (1968) on the influence of wealth on insurance 
demand make it difficult to judge the variable’s empirical results. This study em-
ploys the number of dwellings per 1000 inhabitants as a measure of private wealth 
and assumes that its effect is positive on non-life, property-liability insurance 
demand. Theoretically oriented research and models are also fond of employ-
ing housing or durable consumption stock in utility function. Aoki et al. (2004) 
provide a microeconomic foundation of how housing wealth affects consumption 
expenditure via risk premium of households’ loan. Another interesting examina-
tion of households’ wealth is the paper of Bruce et al. (2004), in which they in-
vestigate the relation between economic and subjective well-being. According to 
their results, consumption, income, and wealth together alter the satisfaction level 
of households. This result rationalises the appearance of housing and financial 
wealth in utility function, for instance, the money-in-the-utility approach in the 
literature of monetary theory.
Financial development is associated with the widespread securitisation of 
cash flows, which enables households to secure future income through the own-
ership of financial assets. By offering similar benefits, life insurance is expected 
to gene rate higher sales in countries with a high level of financial development. 
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The measurement of financial development is very controversial (Jung 1986), 
but two alternative proxies are usually employed. One is the ratio of quasi-mon-
ey (M2-M1) to the broad definition of money (M2), which shows the complex-
ity of the financial structure (a higher ratio indicates a higher level of financial 
development), another is the ratio of M2 to the nominal GDP – financial deep-
ening (demand for money per unit of output). Broad money M2 is often taken 
as an adequate measure of the financial sector in developing countries in view 
of the predominance of the banking sector as well as owing to the lack of data 
on other financial assets (Hemming – Manson 1988; Liu – Woo 1994). Follow-
ing above-quoted previous studies, we use the ratio of quasi-money (M2-M1) 
as a measure of financial development. We hypothesise a positive correlation 
with non-life insurance demand. The next economic variable that we used in 
our research is the inflation rate. It is used to account for monetary discipline. 
It is expressed by the GDP deflator (annual percentage). For non-life insurers, 
unanticipated inflation leads to higher claims costs, thereby eroding profitability. 
Inflation is often accompanied by rising interest rates, which reduce the value 
of return guarantees. Rising inflation can have a negative effect on demand and 
may lead to policyholders cancelling their policies as well as increasing costs for 
insurers. In the case of deflation, or if very low inflation persists, interest rates 
tend to fall. With this variable, we expect a negative correlation with non-life 
insurance consumption. 
We also consider trade activity, the sum of import and export activities as a 
fraction to GDP (trade), since trade often relies on the availability of marine, 
cargo, and liability insurance.
3.2. Demographic factors
Feyen et al. (2011) claim that population size determines the operating back-
ground, that is to say, the size of the market, for the non-life insurance industry. 
Therefore, we include the total population for each country into our regressions 
and assume that its effect on the non-life insurance consumption is positive. The 
level of education positively affects the demand for life insurance for several 
reasons. Namely, the primary motive for purchasing insurance is risk aversion to 
avoid loss. Schlesinger (1981) demonstrates that an individual with a higher loss 
probability, a higher degree of risk aversion, or a lower level of initial wealth, 
will purchase more insurance. Mayers – Smith (1990) believe that closely held 
firms are more likely to purchase insurance than firms with less-concentrated 
ownership for the same reason that an individual purchases insurance, namely 
risk aversion. They further suggest that a company does not exhibit proper risk 
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aversion because risk aversion is not so obvious to the corporate purchasers of 
insurance. As stated previously, even though risk aversion could not perfectly 
explain why consumers would buy insurance, it is still an important indicator. 
Although risk aversion is a “rational” motive for an individual’s purchase of 
insurance, unfortunately, it is difficult to measure. According to Browne – Kim 
(1993), in general, a higher level of education may lead to a greater degree of 
risk aversion and a greater awareness of the necessity of insurance. Nonetheless, 
Szpiro (1985) and Outreville (1990) proved the negative correlation between 
the level of education and risk aversion. They deemed that higher education 
leads to lower risk aversion, which, in turn, leads to more risk-taking by skilled 
and well-educated people. When Browne et al. (2000) and Esho et al. (2004) 
discussed non-life insurance, they also took the level of education as a proxy for 
risk aversion.
On the other hand, the more people are involved in education process, the less 
labour force is presented on the market, reducing thereby the overall GDP of the 
country. Therefore, education is hypothesised to be ambiguous in relation to non-
life insurance demand. As an indicator of the level of education across countries, 
we use the tertiary gross enrolment ratio defined by the UNESCO Institute of 
Statistics as the total enrolment in tertiary education, regardless of age, expressed 
as a proportion of the eligible school-age population. 
3.3. Institutional factors
Legal stability is important for a vibrant and growing non-life insurance mar-
ket. The more stable the legal system in a country, the higher the willingness of 
contracting parties to initiate business relationships. To measure property right 
protection, we use the rule of law index. This index reflects perceptions of the 
extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in 
particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the 
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. The legal system in force 
in a country may impact the development of insurance, as it specifies the liabili-
ties of those responsible for damage, and defines the business environment of in-
surers (Browne et al. 2000). For instance, the United States leads the world in per 
capita consumption of liability insurance. The American legal system may be a 
contributing factor, by encouraging Americans to over-consume property-liabili-
ty insurance (Syverud et al. 1994). Browne et al. (2000) find the legal system to 
be a significant factor in the development of non-life insurance. Esho et al. (2004) 
also investigate the impact of the legal system, but find it non-significant after 
controlling for income and property rights. Recently, Park et al. (2010) showed 
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that the use of a common law legal system is the most important determinant 
of the toughness of bonus–malus systems in automobile insurance. Therefore, a 
positive relationship is hypothesised with non-life insurance consumption.
These institutional factors are measured in units ranging from about –2.5 to 
2.5, with higher values corresponding to lower levels of corruption.
Apart from the actual variables in the empirical model, we will include a dum-
my variable which reflects the accession process to EU membership. We assume 
that joining the EU leads to the increasing openness of the financial markets 
of the countries, the inflow of foreign companies to the internal markets, a rise 
in competition between companies, and thus to more favourable conditions for 
consumers of non-life insurance. Also, the EU dummy can partially explain peo-
ple’s confidence in the financial stability of the economy. Therefore, the positive 
correlation between the EU dummy and the demand for non-life insurance is 
expected. This variable will reflect the importance of joining the EU for non-
members included in the research (Albania, Croatia,6 Macedonia, and Ukraine). 
Together with the demand side, membership in the European Union can have an 
impact on suppliers of non-life insurance, increasing the diversity of products 
offered, reducing the prices due to rise in competition. The EU dummy takes the 
following values: 0 – membership, 1 – non-membership.
Given the hypotheses specified above, we employ the cointegration and error 
correction technique to capture the long-run relationship and short-run dynamics 
between the dependent and independent variables, while avoiding problems of 
spurious correlation often associated with non-stationary time series data (Engle 
– Granger 1987; Adam 1992; Thomas 1993). We specify the model for the deter-
minants of non-life insurance consumption (NLIC) in Central and South-Eastern 
Europe with an expected sign for each variable, as follows:
NLIP = f(GDPPC(+), NPV(+), NDW(+), RQM(+), INF(-), TRADE(+), PD(+), 
EDU(+), RL(+), DUM (+))  (1)
where NLIP = non-life insurance premiums divided by GDP; GDPPC = GDP per 
capita; NPV = number of passenger vehicles per 1000 people; NDW = number 
of dwellings per 1000 inhabitants; RQM = ratio of quasi-money; INF = annual 
percentage; TRADE = trade activity (the sum of import and export activities as a 
fraction to GDP trade); PD = population density; EDU = level of education; RL = 
rule of law; DUM = EU membership.
6  Croatia joined the European Union as its 28th member state in July 2013.
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The log-linear form is indicated for demand functions specified on macroeco-
nomic variables, which tend to display exponential growth. The above model is 
hereby written in log-linear form as:
L(non-life insurance penetration)it = β0 + β1L(GDP per capita)it + β2L(number of pas-
senger cars per 1,000 people)it + β3L(number of dwellings per 1000 inhabitants)it β4 
(ratio of quasi-money)it + β5(infl ation)it + β6L(trade)it + β7L(population density)it + 
β8L(education level)it + β9(rule of law)it + DUMit + uit (2)
where β is a coefficient that will be estimate, uit is a scalar disturbance term, i in-
dexes country in a cross-section, and t indexes time measured in years. Based on 
the established model, we will estimate the determinants that affect the demand 
for non-life insurance in (1) the Balkans countries, (2) the Baltic countries, (3) the 
CEE countries, and in the fourth specification we will estimate the determinants 
of non-life insurance consumption in 14 countries in Central and South-Eastern 
Europe (CSEE).
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
To avoid the problem which may arise because of the existence of non-stationary 
variables, one might have to identify the order of integration of variables. Al-
though several methods have been proposed by considering different assumptions, 
there is no uniformly powerful test for unit root. Nevertheless, it seems there are 
two approaches more popular than the rest. The first approach was provided by 
Dickey – Fuller (1979), which has been developed by Said – Dickey (1984). The 
second was presented by Philips – Perron (1988), which is sometimes known as 
the nonparametric method.   
The ADF and PP tests were performed using 95% critical values (in parenthe-
sis after each statistic). Тhe results7 show that rate of inflation (INF) and popula-
tion density (PD) are stationary at levels in all four specifications. EDU was not 
included in the first and third specifications because the results show that this 
variable is stationary at levels while TRADE was not included in the second 
specification because this variable was stationary at the second difference. The 
immediate conclusion from this analysis is that any dynamic specification of the 
model in the levels of the series is likely to be inappropriate and may be plagued 
by problems of spurious regression (Adam 1992). It is also argued that the econo-
metric results of the model in the levels of the series may not be ideal for policy 
7  The results are available upon request to the authors.
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making. This proposition thus lends credence to the earlier doubts cast over the 
efficacy of past studies in policy decisions. Lastly, the above-mentioned variables 
were not included in the cointegration analysis because by definition, if variable 
is stationary at levels or if variable was stationary at the second difference it is 
not expected to have a long-run relationship with first difference of the variable 
(Adam 1992).  
Since it has been determined that the variables under examination are inte-
grated of the first difference the cointegration test is performed. Cointegration 
analysis addresses the problem of spurious regressions among non-stationary 
time series. Estimation in a system context may shed light on important inter-
relationships among series while reducing the risk of endogeneity bias (Banerjee 
et al. 1993). The most important application of cointegration in economic estima-
tions is that it shows that there is a long-run relationship between variables which 
are cointegrated. The cointegration test proposed by Johansen (1988) is the most 
popular test. 
When we applied Johansen’s test, we first determined the underlying VAR 
(Vector Auto Regression) model for the optimal choice of lag length and the 
conventional information criteria were only used as a rough guideline.8 The lag 
length of VAR was chosen to be k = 1 for all four specifications using different 
information criteria such as Final Prediction Error (FPE), Akaike (AIC), Schwarc 
(SC), and Hannan-Quinn (HQ) for different time lags (Enders 2004). The results 
are shown in Table 5. Next, Johansen’s test takes the vector autoregression (VAR) 
of order k may be written as:
1 1 ....t t P t k ty A y A yμ ε       (3)
where yt is an n×1 vector of variables that are integrated of order one – commonly 
denoted first difference – and εt is an n×1 vector of innovations. This VAR can 
be re-written as 
1
1
k
t i t k t k t
i
y y y εΔ Γ Δ Π

 

    (4) 
where yt is a n×1 vector of endogenous variables, i.e. yt [LNLIP LGDPPC LNPC 
LNDW RQM LTRADE]τ, εt a n×1 vector of stochastic disturbances. The rank r of 
8  On account of the overparameterisation problem associated with VAR models, we set the 
maximum lag length to three for all four specifications. Excessive parameterisation of re-
gression equations can cause depletion of degrees of freedom and contribute to estimates of 
irrelevant and biased coefficients.
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matrix Π gives the statistical properties of the VAR. Full rank r = n implies that 
VAR is stationary. Rank r = 0 implies that VAR is nonstationary with no cointe-
grating equations. Reduced rank 0 < r < n means r cointegrating equations. Matrix 
Π can be decomposed as Π = αβτ, where α is n×r matrix of speed of adjustments 
and β is an n×r matrix of F parameters which determines the cointegrating rela-
tionships. The columns of β are interpreted as long-run equilibrium relationships 
between the variables. Matrix α determines the speed of adjustment towards this 
equilibrium. Values of α close to zero imply slow convergence.
Johansen’s procedure is used for cointegration testing. Johansen derives a test 
on the number of characteristic roots that are different from zero by considering 
the two following statistics: the trace eigenvalue statistic (λtrace) and maximum 
eigen value statistic (λmax) (Johansen 1988). The likelihood ratio statistics sug-
gested by Johansen (1988) for trace and eigenvalue test are:
1
( ) (1 )
p
trace r
i r
r T Inλ λ

 
   . (5)
The trace λtrace statistics test the null hypothesis that the number of distinct characteristics roots is less than or equal to r, against the general unrestricted 
alternative. Where the value of the characteristics root is close to zero, the λtrace statistics is smaller, and it will be larger relative to the value of the characteristics 
root, when further from zero.
The maximum eingenvalue λmax statistics is:
1( , 1) (1 )rmax r r TIn

   λ λ  (6)
where T represents the number of usable observations; λ represents the largest 
estimated value of ith characteristics root (eigenvalue) obtained from the matrix 
r = 0, 1, 2, 3, …….. P–1.
For λmax statistics, the null hypothesis r = 0 is tested against the alternative that 
r = 1, the alternative r = 2, and so on. Where the estimated value of the char-
acteristics root is close to zero, λmax will be smaller. If there is a different result between trace statistic and maximum eigenvalue test, maximum eigenvalue result 
is preferred (Banerjee et al. 1993).
The result of the cointegration tests suggests that there is one cointegrating 
vector in trace eigenvalue statistic, and one cointegrating vector in maximum 
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eigenvalue statistic.9 The results suggest that there is a long-run relationship be-
tween the tested variables in all four specifications.10 
Following the literature (Johansen1990), we normalised this vector by setting 
the coefficient on the non-life insurance penetration at –1.0 so that the vector may 
be interpreted as a dependent variable.11 First, note that the long-run regression 
results indicate a positive association between the number of passenger vehicles 
per 1000 people and non-life insurance consumption in all four specifications. 
This finding confirms the empirical result in the literature that a high number 
of passenger cars per 1000 people impacts positively on non-life insurance con-
sumption (Feyen et al. 2011). This result suggests that car liability insurance 
takes a dominant place in the insurance market in CSEE countries and confirms 
that car penetration is a driver of insurance development in CSEE countries. The 
reason for this is that people in these countries are not yet sufficiently informed 
and have not yet acquired an insurance culture, and mainly use car insurance or 
compulsory motor third party liability insurance (comprehensive car insurance is 
usually voluntary but also common in many countries). This could also explain 
why LTRADE does not enter significantly in our models.
The positive effect of GDP per capita in non-life insurance consumption in the 
long-run as amplified in the development literature is confirmed by the results of 
this study. GDP per capita has a positive impact on non-life insurance consump-
tion during the period under investigation, but is statistically significant only in 
the first sub-group (Balkan countries). Obviously, increased income allows for 
higher consumption in general, makes insurance more affordable, and creates a 
greater demand for non-life insurance to safeguard acquired property. The posi-
tive impact of macroeconomic conditions on purchasing decisions of non-life 
insurance indicates that the good shape of the domestic economy of the Balkan 
countries is a source of the growth of operations of the real sector and other cus-
tomers of insurance companies, and creates higher demand for new insurance 
(i.e. property insurance and protection against financial risk). At the same time, 
a dynamically growing economy is associated with lower values of gross paid 
claims. 
We used the number of dwellings per 1000 inhabitants in this study as a meas-
ure of risk-aversion. This variable is positively and statistically significant in our 
fourth model. This result means that the higher the number of dwellings, the 
 9  The results are available upon request to the authors.
 10  Exogenous variables (RL, LEDU, LPD and DUM) will not appear in the long run because we 
presume that the variables are determined outside the system and will only appear in the short 
run, while these variables are assumed to be independent from others in the long run.
11  The results are available upon request to the authors.
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greater the demand for insurance. This corresponds to the prior research of Esho 
et al. (2004), which confirms that risk aversion has a significant impact on non-
life insurance demand. 
Furthermore, we transform VAR in VECM (Vector Error Correction Model) 
and we estimated VECM system with the short-run dynamic.  
' '
1
1 0
( ) ( )
n n
t t k t k t
k k
L NLIP L NLIP F DUM ECMμ γ αΔ Δ Δ  
 
      (7) 
where F is a vector of the stationary forms for nine vectors related to GDP per 
capita, number of passenger cars per 1000 people, number of dwellings per 1000 
inhabitants, ratio of quasi-money, trade, inflation, population density, education 
level and rule of law, and one dummy variable which reflects the accession proc-
ess to European Union membership. The error-correction-term ECMt–1 is defined 
as the difference between the actual non-life insurance penetration at time t–1 
and its estimate from the long-run equation in the same period. The presence of 
ECM t–1  in this equation demonstrates the dynamic short-run adjustment. When the 
non-life insurance penetration deviates from its long-run equilibrium, the ECM 
term will subsequently work to bring it back to the equilibrium level. Therefore, 
its coefficient is expected to be negative.
In the short run, only the rule of law has significant influence on non-life insur-
ance consumption, in the third and fourth specifications. The positive estimated 
coefficient on the rule of law is consistent with the idea that this variable pro-
vides individuals and firms with the right to own and sell assets, and protection 
against damage or devaluation of such assets by third parties. Knack – Keefer 
(1995, 2000) have shown that the insecurity of property rights reduces economic 
growth, as firms may adopt less than optimal fixed capital assets because of ex-
propriation risk, avoid investments in assets that are capital intensive, or operate 
at an inefficient scale. In terms of non-life insurance, the enforcement of property 
rights create an economic incentive to acquire and insure property, since govern-
ment and legal enforcement of property rights help to protect individuals from 
loss or damage to the asset. Moreover, given that insurers have a positive prob-
ability of insolvency, insurance liabilities may be viewed as analogous to risky 
corporate debt (Cummins – Danzen 1997). Therefore, as in the case of debt and 
equity markets, it is likely that the development of insurance markets and thereby 
additional financial intermediation in CSEE countries is also critically dependent 
upon the quality of the underlying legal and political system.
The dummy variable is statistically significant in the fourth specification at the 
1% level of significance and points to 0.15 percentage points higher demand for 
non-life insurance only as a result of membership in the European Union. The 
membership in EU increases consumers’ confidence in the stability of the market, 
124 J. KJOSEVSKI – M. PETKOVSKI
Acta Oeconomica 65 (2015)
thus stimulating the demand for non-life insurance products. Prior to becoming a 
member of the EU, new entrants had to implement a number of reforms in order 
to improve their economic environment and measure up the EU standards. There-
fore, we can mark the importance of working on joining the EU by non-members 
included in the research (Albania, Croatia, Macedonia, and Ukraine).
Moreover, parameter α has expected negative sign in all four groups, which 
determines the speed of adjustment towards equilibrium. The speed of the adjust-
ment parameter is –0.73 in CSEE-14, followed by –0.32 in CEE-7, 0.11 in B-3 
and 0.03 in BAL-4. This means that the disequilibrium can be corrected at the 
rate of 73%, 32%, 11%, and 0.03%, respectively.12
The models are also checked for the explanatory power of the coefficient of 
determination, important influence of dependent variables, heteroscedasticity, se-
rial correlation, and normality of the parameters of the equations.
The coefficient of determination R2 in the presented four equations is 72.43% 
in BAL-4, 68.56% in B-3, 70.56% in CEE, 78.67% in CEE-7, –0.32 in CSEE-14. 
This means that the dependent variable is explained at 72.43%, 68.56%, 70,56%, 
and 63.67%, respectively, by the independent variables. The estimated equation F 
in the equations is 0.029, 0.084, 0.047, and 0.036 for all four specifications. As a 
consequence of these results, we can conclude that the explanatory variables have 
a significant influence on the variation of dependent variables at the 5% level in 
all four specifications. The residual heteroscedasticity Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
test (p-value 0.9982, 0.8735, 07542 and 0.7421) indicates no heteroscedasticity 
in the models. The Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test showed there is no serial corre-
lation between residuals at any lag (p-value 0.1264, 0.1178, 0.2367 and 0.1954). 
The Jarque-Bera test is used for testing whether the series is normally distributed. 
The test statistic measures the difference of the skewness and kurtosis of the se-
ries compared to those from the normal distribution. From the results, we cannot 
reject the null hypothesis of a normal distribution, and can therefore conclude that 
these residuals have a normal distribution in all four specifications.13
5. CONCLUSION
This paper ascertains empirically the determinants of non-life insurance con-
sumption in 14 countries of Central and South-Eastern Europe using time series 
data from 1995 to 2010 by applying cointegration and vector error correction 
models. We found proof of the existence of a long-run relationship and short-
12  The results are available upon request to the authors.
13  The results are available upon request to the authors.
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run dynamics among the variables under consideration. We showed that the 
number of dwellings per 1000 inhabitants and the number of passenger cars per 
1000 people positively and significantly influence non-life insurance consump-
tion. On the other hand, we discovered that the number of passenger cars, the 
quality of the rule of law, and EU membership are significant predictors of non-
life insurance consumption in the short run only. In addition, the results indicate 
a well-defined error correction term, which is significant at 5% with a feedback 
effect of about 63%. 
In general, B-3 and CEE-7 countries have a more developed insurance (life 
and non-life) sector than BAL-4 countries. Better regulation and supervision in 
B-3 and CEE-7 were partly motivated by the need to adopt EU standards. Thus, 
many of the insurance sector weaknesses traditionally characterising emerging 
markets have gradually been eliminated. EU membership increases consumers’ 
confidence in the stability of the market, thus stimulating the demand for non-life 
insurance products. Prior to becoming a member of the EU, new entrants had to 
implement a number of reforms in order to improve their economic environment 
and measure up the EU standards. Therefore, we can mark the importance of 
working on joining the EU by non-members included in the research.
The result of this paper is that the Central and South-Eastern Europe countries 
should be regarded as a highly potential region with dynamic and fast-growing 
insurance markets. Taking into account the impact of insurance development on 
economic growth, the increase of the non-life insurance sector should be viewed 
as an inevitable part of stable economic development. In future research, when 
more data become available, it would be useful to take a much bigger sample in 
terms of countries and periods, which would lead to a better understanding and 
knowledge of the determinants of non-life insurance demand.
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